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We explore the relationship between litigation rates and the number of lawyers, in a
typical supplier-induced demand (SID) frame. Drawing on an original panel dataset for
the 169 Italian courts of justice between 2000 and 2007, we rst document that the num-
ber of lawyers is positively correlated with dierent measures of litigation rate. Then,
using an instrumental variables strategy we nd that a 10 percent increase of lawyers
over population is associated with an increase between 1.6 to 6 percent in civil litigation
rates. Thus, our empirical analysis supports the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers:
following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit their informational
advantage to induce clients to access to courts even when litigation is unnecessary or
ineective.
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1Sanctus Ivo erat Brito / Advocatus et non latro / Res miranda populo (Saint Ivo was
Breton / A lawyer and not a thief / Something hard to believe). From the inscription in
Treguier on the grave of Saint Ivo of Kremartin, patron saint of lawyers, a lawyer himself.
1 Motivation
On 30th June 2009, the day after the New York Court of Justice released the verdict to
condemn Bernie Mado to 150 years of conviction for his nancial fraud,1 Corriere della
Sera, the most read and prestigious newspaper in Italy, reported the above vignette by its
satiric columnist.2 The vignette, show in its two halves a person in front of a court. In one
half, it says: \US: six months for a 150 years sentence"; in the other, \Italy: 150 years for a
six months sentence".
The vignette is probably the best summary we could nd for the present work. Italy is
quite rarely in the top positions of international rankings. However, in few other elds it can
exhibit such an impressive collection of negative records as in the international comparisons
for the legal system and the administration of justice. Not only Italy is the European country
with the highest absolute numbers of both incoming and pending litigious civil cases into
courts; but is also one of the European countries with the longest times to dispose of cases in
rst instance courts: 507 days on average for litigious civil cases (CEPEJ, 2008). It is perhaps
not too surprising that Italy is the European country with the highest number of lawyers in
absolute terms: in 2006 they were 170,143, compared to 138,104 lawyers in Germany, and
47,765 in France (CEPEJ, 2008). For instance, the city of Naples alone counted almost
the same lawyers than in all England (Consiglio Nazionale Forense, 2009; CEPEJ, 2008).
Furthermore, Italy is also the European country with the second highest number of lawyers
per 100,000 inhabitants: 290 (only second to the 342 of Greece), compared to 168 of Germany,
76 of France, 22 of United Kingdom (CEPEJ, 2008).
What is even more striking is the impressive rate at which the number of lawyers has been
increased in the last decades: according to data ocially released by the agency managing the
lawyers' pension scheme, lawyers have more than tripled in Italy, jumping from 42,366 in 1990
to 143,976 professionals in 2008 (+239.84%; Cassa Nazionale Forense, 2009). The trend is
common to many other professionals in Italy, including accountants and business consultants
(14,474 in 1992, become 48,109 in 2007, +232.38%; Cassa Nazionale di Previdenza dei Dottori
Commercialisti, 2009). However, it is striking that such a jump in the number of lawyers
occurred in a period in which the national GDP increased only by the 23.88% in real terms
(IMF, 2009).
It is also in the period 1990-2007 that the litigation rate, measured by the number of
pending proceedings have further increased: incoming proceedings increased from 524.3 per
100.000 inhabitants in 1990 to 658.8 in 2007 (+25.7%), while pending proceedings passed
from 804.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 1644.7 in 2007 (+104,4%).
The two trends in the increase in the number of lawyers and in the litigation are very
likely to be related. Figure 1 below shows the correlation between the number of lawyers
active in each court of justice and the litigation rate in that province. As it can be seen the
positive correlation is quite sharp.
1An updated version of the infamous \Ponzi scheme".
2Emilio Giannelli, a lawyer and former Director of Legal Aairs of the third biggest Italian bank, Monte
Paschi di Siena.































































































































































These recent trends have recently attracted some attention from the literature on law
and economics. Marchesi (2003) suggests that the higher litigation rate could have been
caused by the existence of long trials: in fact, long waiting times to obtain a sentence give
incentives to one of the party to breach contracts in the attempt to postpone due payments.
Marchesi (2003) also observes that at least three, out of ve, actors involved in a trial may
have incentives to delay the time to obtain a sentence, namely the party that is in the wrong
and the lawyers of both parties. In Italy, in fact, lawyers are typically paid according to the
time and the number of judicial acts they are devoting to a case.
Some other studies have rather focused of the organization on the \supply" of justice
in Italy and have mostly pointed to the low productivity by judges as the main responsible
for high waiting times. Coviello et al. (2009), for instance, analyze the organization of two
sections specialized in labor disputes in the of courts of justice of Milan and Turin, and
observe that judicial oces working \in series" - that is, opening a new le only when the
previous ones have reached a sentence - appear to be signicantly associated with shorter
waiting times than oces working \in parallel".
Here we explore an alternative route. We explicitly test the hypothesis that the high
litigation rate might be caused by an \excessive" access to courts by citizens. In particular,
referring to the health economics literature, we propose an application of the supplier-induced-
demand (SID) hypothesis to the case of Italian judicial system.
Under that perspective, an increase in the number of lawyers, and therefore in the density
ratio between lawyers and population, might have forced lawyers to \induce" their clients to
access more often the courts even when a judicial solution would have not been necessary or
eective. Such an opportunistic behavior by the lawyers is possible because of the asymmetric
information and imperfect agency relation between lawyers and their clients, and might be
favored by the joint eect of tougher competition, caused by the new entrants, and of uniform
minimum fees for service, required by the actual institutional context and the organization
3of legal professions in Italy. The induced, excessive demand for judicial resolution might thus
have in
ated the litigation rate.
In order to test this hypothesis, we have collected data from dierent ocial sources and
built an original dataset on the 169 Italian courts of justice, considered in the period 2000-
2007. In our OLS estimates, to mitigate for omitted variables bias we control for the number
of judges in the court, for major socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as the
levels of GDP, employment rate, population density, urbanization rate, education and social
capital in the province. We exploit the panel structure of our data by estimating OLS models
that allow for both province- and time-xed eects.
Even after controlling for other determinants of litigation and for xed eects, the num-
ber of lawyers across provinces could be correlated with the error term for several reasons.
For instance, local higher rates of civil litigation in one court could attract lawyers into that
province, which would bias our OLS estimates upward. In order to address this potential en-
dogeneity problem, we adopt a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) approach. What is needed
is an instrument that is correlated with lawyers in the province and uncorrelated with un-
observed factors that aects litigation. We consider two instrumental variables. The rst is
based on the xed coecient approach (Freeman, 1980; Bartik, 1991; Blanchard and Katz,
1992; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Card, 2001; Gould et al., 2002; Cortes, 2008): by consider-
ing the national levels of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across
provinces, we introduce an exogenous source of variation to be used as instrument for lawyers.
The second instrument, based on the methodology proposed by Card (1993), is the average
proximity of the province to the three faculties that oer law courses enabling to become
lawyer.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does indeed exert
a positive and statistically signicant eect on the litigation rate. A 10% increase in the
number of lawyers over population is associated with a 1.6% to 6% increase in litigation rates.
This eect is robust across several specications and checks, both on the control variables
and the instruments. Our results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers. In
particular, our evidence supports the idea that, following an increase in their relative number,
lawyers may have taken advantage of the informational asymmetry to induce clients to access
to the courts even when litigation would have not been necessary or eective.
Our work is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main characteristics of the
organization of justice and of the legal professions in Italy. Section 3 reviews the literature
on SID in health economics and applies it to the Italian judicial system. Section 4 describes
the data and the variables. Section 5 reports the empirical strategy and the estimation
results. Section 6 concludes with an overall discussion of the results.
2 The Organization of Justice in Italy
2.1 Courts of justice and judges
The administration of justice in Italy is organized in three degrees of courts of justice, that
can be sequentially accessed. As a rst level, there are 169 rst instance courts of justice
(Tribunali di primo grado). In many cases they cover the same geographic areas where the
provincial administrative governments have jurisdiction. However, in several cases, especially
in Piedmont and South Italy, there is more than one court of justice for province: some cover
the most populated cities, some other follow the old jurisdictions of the former independent
4states existing before Italian unication in 1848. In 2008, a total number of 4,503 professional
judges work in the 169 rst instance courts of justice (CSM, 2009), divided almost equally
between sections of the courts specialized in civil and penal justice (Sezioni civili and Sezioni
penali, respectively).3
It is interesting to notice the evolution of the number of professional judges in the Italian
rst instance courts of justice: in the ten-years period 1998-2008, their number increased
by 31,74%, passing from 3,418 to 4,503 (CSM, 2009). However, such a trend has not been
monotonic. At the contrary, most the increase in the number of judges took place in 2000,
2002 and 2004, when more than 5,000 magistrates were active (CSM, 2009). That number,
however, declined in the immediately following years.4 Notice that, between 2000 and 2007,
the period considered for our estimation, the number of professional judges in the Italian rst
instance courts of justice marginally declined (-3,49%) from 4,689 to 4,525.
The parties can appeal the sentence by a rst instance court of justice and then access the
second instance courts of justice. There are 29 second instance, or appeal, courts of justice
(Corti d'Appello), usually one each Italian region, although the most populated regions have
two. The regional areas over which a second instance court of justice has jurisdiction are
called \districts" of appeal courts of justice (Distretti di Corte d'Appello). Finally, but only
for procedural or formal matters, the parties can also appeal the sentence by the second
instance courts of justice and then access the nal degree of justice (Corte di Cassazione),
which is only in Rome. It is important to notice that the distribution of professional judges
across the three levels of justice is greatly skewed in favor of the rst instance courts of
justice: for instance, of the 6,450 professional judges totally active in 2006 in all levels of
justice, as many as 4,633 worked in the rst instance courts (CEPEJ, 2008; CSM, 2009).5 It
is also important to bear in mind that, according to comparative statistics, Italy is among
the European countries with the lowest number of professional judges sitting in courts per
100,000 inhabitants (11 in 2006, compared to an European average of 19.8).
To conclude the description of the organization of Italian courts of justice, we should
mention the existence of non-professional judges, and, in particular, the institution in 1995
for civil, and 2002 for penal matters, of the gure of honorary judges of peace (Giudici
di Pace): they are well respected and experienced law professionals that are temporarily
appointed as honorary judges for a (renewable) period of four years, and serve as preliminary
rst instance courts for small claims such as controversies about houses, 
ats and gardens;
goods and services of a value up to an amount of 2,582.28 euro; vehicles for a value up to
15,493.71 euro, among others.6 There are currently 3,403 honorary judges of peace operating
3In the larger courts of justice, typically the ones operating in the main cities where the second instance
courts of justice are, some of the civil justice sections focus on the legal matters related to labor contracts
(Giudici del lavoro). Administrative and tributary matters are instead dealt by specialized rst instance courts
of justice.
4The reason behind this periodic increase, and then contraction, of the number of judges, is mainly due to
the selection process to appoint the judges. The selection of judges is very strict and competitive: it requires
a three-stage examination of the candidates at a national level that needs approximately two years to be
concluded, and usually takes place every second year, following an ocial call for applications by the Ministry
of Justice. Moreover, it can be noticed that, at least since 2004 on, where magistrates were 5,040, the total
number of judges has been constantly declining (CSM, 2009). This is also re
ecting the fact that, after 2004,
no further selection to appoint new magistrates has taken place.
5Notice that this gure does not include the 2,231 (in 2006: CEPEJ, 2008) professional public prosecutors
(Procuratori della Repubblica) operating in the separate and independent sections (Procure) within the rst
instance courts of justice.
6The access to these honorary judges is much quicker, easier and cheaper for the parties than the one to
5in Italy, distributed roughly in proportion of the professional judges in each rst instance
courts of justice (CEPEJ, 2008; Italian Ministry of Justice, 2009). The introduction of the
honorary judges, aiming at turn away the simpler cases and smaller claims from the ordinary
courts of justice already operating above capacity, it has been proved to be successful in
reducing the number of les still pending in front of the courts of justice and in contributing
to reduce the average time to reach a sentence.7
2.2 Cases
To test the relationship between number of lawyers and litigation rate, we will focus on the
civil cases processed by the rst instance courts of justice, including the ones processed by
honorary judges of peace. The choice to focus on litigation in civil courts only is mainly
motivated by the crucial dierence between civil and penal cases in the Italian justice. In
fact, while a civil case may be started by any citizen, assisted by a lawyer, and is therefore
a natural candidate to test the SID hypothesis, a penal le have to be started by a public
prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers.
The natural starting point is a comparative perspective within the European countries.
Ocial statistics by CEPEJ (2008) gives Italy a number of international records. Considering
2006 statistics, for instance, Italy is the European country with the highest absolute number
of incoming litigious civil cases into rst instance courts: 2,825,453, compared to 1,104,828
cases of Germany and 1,688,367 of France (CEPEJ, 2008). Such a massive in
ow of incoming
cases, rather than an exception, is in line with the trend in the last fteen-years period, and
clearly contributes to keep the total number of pending civil litigious cases (at the end of
2006) at 3,687,965, again the highest absolute gure in Europe (CEPEJ, 2008). Even when
such statistics are read in relative terms, the record of Italy remains greatly unchallenged:
concerning 2006 data, Italy is the European country with the second highest number (after
the Netherlands) of rst instance incoming litigious civil cases per 100,000 inhabitants (4,809,
compared to 2,672 of France and 1,342 of Germany: CEPEJ, 2008).
The high and constant number of incoming civil cases and the massive stock of pending
cases have clearly an eect on the length of time necessary for a case to be disposed of by
the courts. Indeed, the statistics on the average number of days that cases are outstanding
or remain unresolved (disposition time) gives Italy some of the longest times to dispose of
cases in rst instance courts: 107 days were needed in 2006 for a non-litigious civil case,
while as many as 507 days were needed for litigious civil cases, compared to 36 and 262 days,
respectively, in France (CEPEJ, 2008).8
2.3 Lawyers
The organization of lawyers in Italy closely follows the organization of the courts of justice.
Lawyers have to be enrolled in an ocial compulsory register (Albo professionale) that is hold
and supervised by a local professional bar association (Ordine degli avvocati), to which the
national law gives extensive legal prerogatives. There are 169 local professional associations,
the ordinary rst instance courts of justice; usually controversies are reconciled by proposing a compromise
solution for the parties; sentences are rarely appealed to the ordinary courts of justice.
7Nevertheless ocial comparative statistics show that Italy is still among the European countries with the
lowest numbers of both non-professional judge per professional judge (1.1 in 2006, the fourth lowest gure)
and non-professional judges per 100.000 inhabitants (12 in 2006, the third lowest gure: CEPEJ, 2008).
8Among European Union countries, only Cyprus and Slovenia do worse than Italy.
6one every rst instance court of justice. Bar associations are formed by all lawyers enrolled in
the ocial register, who elect a council and a chairman (Consiglio e Presidente dell'Ordine).
The latter are legally in charge of the supervision on the ocial register and, more generally,
on the professional conduct of the associates. They also decide on all controversies among
lawyers, and between lawyers and their clients, and, in order to enforce their supervision
on the professional conduct of the associates, have some disciplinary powers, such as the
suspension or expulsion from the ocial register.
The national law also regulates the criteria needed for lawyers being eligible to enroll
into ocial registers. In fact, access to the legal profession in Italy requires a rst degree in
law (5 years), followed by a two-year apprenticeship in a lawyers' oce (Praticantato). In
order to obtain the ocial qualication as lawyers, successful candidates have then to pass a
two-stage selection process, which is taking approximately one year.
Besides the local professional associations, a national council of lawyers (Consiglio Nazionale
Forense) operates at the Ministry of Justice in Rome, to decide on controversies between lo-
cal associations. The main prerogative of the national council of lawyers, however, is to set,
every second year, all the payment taris and fees for service to be paid to lawyers, for civil,
penal, administrative and tributary cases. Such decisions by the national council are subject
to formal approval by the Ministry of Justice and are then legally binding for all lawyers and
uniform across every local registers.9
In particular, the payment scheme set by the national council show some important
features. First, unlike in other systems, contingent fees are not possible: the payment is
always due and the client must pay the amount to the lawyer regardless of the outcome
of the controversy. Secondly, the overall payment to the lawyer is directly proportional to
the amount of legal services and acts provided by the lawyers. Moreover, even though it
is possible to agree on a premium payment to the lawyer in case of a positive outcome,
payments proportional to the value of the controversy are also explicitly ruled out. Finally,
and importantly, the payment scheme as set by the national council is legally binding. In
particular, no payment can be charged below the level set by the national council of lawyers,
that thus serves as a compulsory minimum fee.10 Lawyers, however, are free, at a large
extent, to ask any higher payments than the amounts set by the national council.
Data on the number of lawyers are available from two dierent sources. On the one
hand, the national council of lawyers does not provide yearly data on the number of lawyers
enrolled into each local register, while these statistics are available only every two-three years.
The main reason why this source of data is scarcely reliable for an empirical investigation
does not lie in their incomplete availability, though. In fact, by their nature, the registers
from the local bar associations include all graduates in law who, at some point, got the
professional qualication as lawyers, but actually no longer work, or even have never worked,
as lawyers. This is because in Italy who got the professional qualication as a lawyer has the
right to remain in the ocial register regardless of whether, and how eectively, is working
as lawyer. The local registers thus include many professionals who are actually working only
9In particular, the Ministry of Justice decree 127/2004 species that the payment to the lawyers (parcella)
is constituted, on the top of the reimbursement of all expenses, by two parts: the taris (onorari), and the
fees for services (diritti).
10The existence of such minimum compulsory fees for legal services has been challenged by the decree
223/2006 (the so-called Bersani decree) aiming at their elimination. Although the national council of lawyers
opposed the decree and tried to limit its applicability, the decree became nally operating from 2008. This also
explains the 2000-2007 time period we have considered for our empirical estimation. The Italian Parliament
is currently debating a new law reintroducing compulsory minimum fees for lawyers' services.
7occasionally, or have soon abandoned the profession for dierent career patterns.11
As the two sources of data dier, there is a discrepancy between the number of lawyers
registered to the ocial registers (Albo Avvocati) and the number of those enrolled into the
professional pension scheme (Cassa Forense). In particular, the latter underestimates the
ocial number of lawyers.12 As empirical estimates are concerned, issues may arise only
if the dierence between the two measures would change over time within provinces. Data
available show that the ratio between the two measures is approximately constant across time
within provinces. Therefore, controlling for both province- and time-xed eects allows to
adequately deal with the potential measurement error.13
Data show that in less than 20 years, the number of lawyers enrolled in the national
pension scheme more than tripled, jumping from 42,366 professionals in 1990 to 143,976 in
2008 (+239.84%). The total number of lawyers doubled during the 90s and, between 2000 and
2007 (the period considered for our estimation), experienced an equally impressive increase
(+65.48%), from 82,637 to 136,750 professionals (Cassa Nazionale Forense, 2009).
As already mentioned, European statistics show that in 2006 Italy was the European
country with the highest absolute number of lawyers, and the highest number of lawyers
per professional judge: 26.4, compared to 7.1 of France, 6.9 of Germany and 3.2 of United
Kingdom. Italy was also the European country with the second highest number of lawyers per
100,000 inhabitants: 290 (only second to the 342 of Greece), compared to 168 of Germany,
76 of France and 22 of United Kingdom (CEPEJ, 2008).
3 The Supplier-Induced-Demand Hypothesis
Direct inspection of ocial statistics shows that a greater supply of lawyers went hand-in-hand
with an increased litigation rate in Italian courts of justice. For instance, in the 1990-2007
period, while the number of lawyers almost tripled, the number of les pending in front of the
rst instance courts of justice increased by 104.4%. Looking at provincial level (see Figure
1), it emerges a strong correlation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate in
the local courts, this generally holding for several denitions of litigation.
The mere fact that consumption of legal services, and therefore, litigation rate increases
with the number of lawyers, however, it is consistent with several explanations. For instance,
if the market for lawyers were competitive, then an increase in the number of lawyers should
lead to an outward shift of the market supply function. Combined with a downward-sloped
demand curve, this predicts an increase in the number of traded legal services, paired by
a fall in their fees. The eect on total expenditure is ambiguous and depends on the price
elasticity of demand. Under this perspective the higher litigation rate is simply the demand
reaction to lower fees consequent to an increase in the supply, and is therefore nothing but a
11How serious is this issue is conrmed by the recent, ercely debated, intention by the national council of
lawyers to exclude from the local registers any professional who is not earning from the lawyers' activity a
minimum level of income. The statistics published in the ocial publication by Cassa Forense (Biancoore,
2009; Donella, 2009) show that 47.605 lawyers enrolled in the ocial registers declared in 2008 no income from
the legal profession.
12In 2008, 53,969 lawyers were enrolled into the ocial registers but not in the national pension scheme.
The discrepancy between the two measures appears to be specially large in southern Italian provinces. Many
possible explanations can be put forward. Since the enrollment into the pension scheme is compulsory only
from a minimum threshold of earned income, it may be more dicult for lawyers in southern Italian regions
to earn a suciently high income. Tax evasion may be an alternative explanation.
13For a detailed analysis of the discrepancy between these two sources see Donella (2009)
8market adjustment.
The argument based upon this market explanation, however, cannot apply to the case
of Italian lawyers. In fact, the Italian institutional context has greatly favored a substantial
rigidity of lawyers' fees. The main cause for lawyers' fees failing to decline is related to the
above discussed legal privilege by the national council of lawyers to set a minimum fee for
legal service, which is binding and uniform across all Italian courts of justice.14 The existence
of such minimum fees may not only represent a lower bound for the attempts to decrease
prices, but also serve as a salient reference price for lawyers when setting their fees,15 thus
curbing price competition, as also pointed out by the Italian antitrust authority in several
occasions (Autorit a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 1997, 2009).
As we will argue below, the joint presence of a compulsory minimum fee, set by the
national council of lawyers, and of a suciently large share of new entrants in the market
who are willing to provide legal services at the minimum fee, are conditions that makes the
above market explanation hard to believe for the case of Italian lawyers.
An explanation alternative to physiological market adjustment can in fact be found in the
peculiarities of the lawyer-client relationship. One of the key ingredient of this relationship is
the clients' incomplete information about their true needs. Typically clients who consults a
lawyer only knows that they require some legal assistance, because, for instance, they are not
satised with some contractual obligation or extra-contractual relation. Typically, the client
tends to trust the better informed lawyer, to delegate to the latter the choice of the exact
legal and juridical instruments, and, more often than not, to follow the lawyer's advices and
recommendations. Services from the legal professions, such as the ones by doctors, nancial
experts or art consultants, can in fact be viewed as credence goods, in the sense of Darby
and Karni (1973): even after having used such services, due to the informational asymmetry
clients cannot verify whether professionals acted in their interests.
This remains without consequences as long as lawyers act as perfect agents for the clients,
choosing what the clients would have chosen if they had possessed all necessary legal knowl-
edge. It does become a problem, however, as long as the lawyers' decisions on behalf of the
clients are in
uenced by their own interests. Lawyers, in fact, are not merely agents but also
providers and sellers of legal services. Italian lawyers are not an exception. Indeed, interests
of lawyers and clients are potentially con
icting in two aspects.
First, following an increase in the number of lawyers, such as the one observed for Italy
in the 1992-2007 period, lawyers may have faced the threat of a strong competitive pressure
in terms of fewer clients in their portfolio. Lawyers, however, may envisage the goal to
secure their own full employment or to maintain their previous, higher, income level. This
would be consistent with the target income hypothesis by Evans (1974), originally applied to
physicians, by which professionals have a desired level of income that they strive to achieve,
or to restore, whenever actual income falls below the target. In such a case, following an
enhanced competitive pressure and a contraction in clients' portfolio, lawyers may have been
tempted by manipulating the information provided to their clients in order to induce them
to unnecessarily access to courts. This potential source of con
ict of interests is favored by
14A similar relation has been observed in health economics literature between increased supply of physicians
and increase in utilization of health care services, in spite of non declining prices for medical services: Fuchs
(1978) observe it in US even in presence of higher fees; Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986)
detect it in some German Lander where fees were xed at a uniform rate across regions; Grytten et al. (1990)
observe it for the demand for dental services in Norway, where a national xed price was in place.
15For a model and some experimental evidence of the role of reference prices in coordinating pricing strategies
and favoring collusive behavior see Miraldo (2009) and Galizzi and Miraldo (2009).
9the Italian legislation by which clients cannot pay to lawyers fees contingent on the outcome
of the litigation.
Secondly, once started a case, lawyers have interest in inducing the client to request a
large number of acts and legal services. In fact, potential con
ict of interests are exacerbated
by the fact that in Italy the payment scheme designed by the national council of lawyers is
not only proportional to the time and eort spent in a case, but also integrated by a plethora
of fees and taris for each legal act or service supplied.16
Therefore, these potential sources of con
ict of interest make the agency relationship be-
tween lawyers and their clients an imperfect one, and provide to lawyers incentives to exploit
their informational advantage in their own interests, by inducing not necessary, or inecient,
access to courts or excessive provision of legal services. Due to asymmetric information, the
demand by clients can no longer be treated as sovereign, and is, at the contrary, induced by
suppliers.
The supplier-induced-demand hypothesis in the specic case of Italian lawyers can also
be illustrated by mean of a simple graphical representation (Figure 2). Imagine that clients'
demand for legal services (L) negatively depends on the level of lawyers' charged fees (F).
For the sake of simplicity, suppose the initial demand function is linear in fees and can be
represented as D0.











Denote F the minimum fee for service set by the national council of lawyers. As discussed
16Van De Voorde et al. (2001) found some indirect evidence of suppliers-induced demand in the context
of the Belgian national health system, characterized by excessive supply of doctors and by a fee-for-service
system.
10above, this level is uniform across all districts of justice and legally binding for all Italian
lawyers, in the sense that no lawyer in Italy can charge less than F for providing legal
services, while is free, at some extent, to charge fees higher than F. The supply function
of legal services by Italian lawyers can therefore be expressed as a schedule of the following
type:
 for any F < F, L = 0;
 for F = F, L is any value within [0;L0];
 for any F > F, L = L0 + F;
with >0, and where L0 stands for the proportion of lawyers in the market that accept to
supply legal services for a fee equal to the minimum fee set by the national council.
The number L0 of lawyers working for the minimum fee can be thought as a function
of some underlying characteristics of the organization of the legal professions in Italy. For
instance, one can think to L0 as the share of young lawyers in the market. In fact, professionals
that have just gone through all the long selection process, and have recently qualied to work
as lawyers, can typically act as aggressive entrants in the market and, in order to gain
experience and build a clients' portfolio, may therefore accept to work for fees equal to the
minimum set by the national council.17 Alternatively, one can think to L0 as re
ecting
the existent competitive pressure in the provision of legal services from suppliers other than
lawyers. In Italy for instance, workers and consumers can access trade unions and consumers'
associations, respectively, in order to get legal assistance for small claims. On the other hand,
while large companies typically have internal legal oces dealing with most standard issues,
small and medium enterprises are also able to access other categories of consultants (such
as tax advisors, experts in labor and pensions issues, among others), or even consulting
services organized and provided by local chambers of commerce and branches of the business
associations they are member of.18
The supply schedule for legal services can thus be represented as a kinked, piecewise
linear, upward-sloping function with the shape represented by S0 in the gure 2. In fact,
for any fee lower than F, no legal service is provided. For fees exactly equal to the level of
the minimum fee, there is a proportion L0 of lawyers that accept to supply legal services.
The S0 function represented in gure 2, then assumes the remaining share of lawyers oer an
amount of legal services which is directly (and linearly) increasing with the charged fees, as
in a standard upward sloping supply function.
As usual, the intersection between demand and supply function provides the equilibrium
level of legal services and fees in the market. In our case these crucially depend on the initial
relative position of D0 and L0. In fact, when the share L0 of young lawyers is relatively
low compared to the demand schedule, intersection typically occurs in correspondence of the
upward sloped piece of S0, and the equilibrium market fee is higher than the minimum legal
fee, F
0 > F, as in gure 2. On the other hand, when there are relatively many lawyers in the
market that accept to work for the minimum fees, equilibrium fees in the market coincide
with the minimum level set by the national council, F
0 = F, as in gure 3
Clearly, the eects of an increase in the number of active lawyers in the Italian market,
and the likelihood of eventually support the SID hypothesis, ultimately depends on the initial
17Despite the lack of ocial data, anyone can nd support to this conjecture from anecdotal experience and
direct conversations with young lawyers.
18Such as Conndustria, the Italian equivalent of the Confederation of Business Industry in United Kingdom.








market equilibrium. In fact, imagine that, following, for instance, the entry of a 
ow of young
professionals, an increase occurs in the level of active lawyers in the market. This can be
represented by an outward shift of the supply function from S0 to S1: in particular, as more
young lawyers enter the market, the number of lawyers that accept to work for the minimum
fees also shifts outwards, from L0 to L1.
The SID hypothesis assumes that, following the entry of new professionals and the shift
in the supply function, lawyers in the market would be tempted to exploit their asymmetric
advantage in order to induce their clients to demand unnecessary or ineective legal services.
The increase in supply would thus induce also an increase in demand, possibly by a lower
extent. Graphically, the demand schedule would also shift outwards, from D0 to D1. These
shifts would imply that, in the new market equilibrium, clients buy a larger quantity of legal
services from lawyers. Therefore, under the SID hypothesis, an increase in the number of
lawyers in the market would be typically associated to a larger access to courts of justice,
and to a higher litigation rate.
However, to nd a full support to the SID hypothesis, the increase in the litigation rate
should be exclusively due to the articially in
ated demand induced by lawyers. In particular,
to fully accept the SID hypothesis, one should also rule out the possibility that the higher
litigation rate derives from a demand that physiologically increases because of a drop in the
fees. Therefore, the SID hypothesis is compatible only within some specic initial market
equilibrium. In particular, imagine that the initial share of lawyers working for the minimum
fees L0 is relatively low, and that the initial intersection with demand occurs at a point in the
upward-sloped piece of the supply function. As in gure 4, in the initial market equilibrium
12an amount L
0 of legal services are bought at an equilibrium fee F
0, higher than the minimum
fees. In such a case, the induced demand by lawyers following the entry of new professionals
may not be the only explanation to an observed higher litigation rate. In fact, following a
shift from S0 to S1 due to a higher number of lawyers active in the market, and a partially
induced outwards shift in demand, the new market equilibrium implies a higher number of
traded legal services L
1 > L
0, but also a lower equilibrium fee F
1 < F
0. Therefore, even in
presence of some in
ated demand induced by lawyers, it cannot unambiguously ruled out the
possibility that, at some extent, clients have indeed demanded more legal services because
fees have been reduced by increased competition. This, in fact, would also be compatible
with standard market adjustment.
















On the other hand, imagine there are relatively many lawyers in the market that accept to
work for the minimum fees, so that intersection with demand occurs at a point in horizontal
piece of the supply function, and equilibrium fees in the market coincide with the minimum
level set by the national council. In such a case the SID hypothesis may be fully supported as
an explanation for an observed higher rate of access to courts. In fact, following the entry of
more lawyers in the market, lawyers can, through their advises to clients, articially in
ate
the demand for their services to match the higher supply, shifting demand outwards from D0
and D1. This leads to a new market equilibrium, such as the one illustrated in gure 5, in
which a larger amount of legal services is bought, L
1 > L
0, even in presence of unaected
fees for services, that remain xed at the level of the minimum fees F.
Therefore, the SID hypothesis can be supported as a theoretical explanation for an ob-
served increase in the litigation rate after an in
ow of new lawyers into the market. In














particular, the SID hypothesis turns out to be a particularly convincing explanation when
there is a relatively high share of professionals who accept to provide legal services at the
minimum fees set by the national council of lawyers. This is very likely to be the case in
Italy, where, as discussed above, an extraordinarily high number of young professionals have
recently entered the market.
One can still argue that SID is not the only possible explanation accounting for the positive
correlation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate, even in presence of not
declining fees. In particular, a typical argument that can be put forward is one based upon a
reverse direction of causality. When choosing a location for their oce, in fact, young lawyers
may try to assess the areas where demand will be high enough to guarantee a sucient level
of expected revenue. Areas and cities with high demand for the legal services should thus
attract more lawyers than those with low demand. Consequently, a high per capita utilization
of legal services leads to a high lawyers density on average, and not vice-versa, as assumed
by the SID hypothesis. This argument puts emphasis on a potentially serious endogeneity
problem, between the number of lawyers and the demand for legal services. However, applied
econometrics can deal with the endogeneity problem, for instance through the instrumental
variables two-stages technique that we employ in our estimations. Therefore, the denite
answer to such a reverse causality question is simply an empirical matter, that we address
more in detail in the next Sections.
For what concerns the literature on law and economics, to the best of our knowledge, no
study has yet directly and explicitly tested the SID hypothesis for legal services. However,
some indirect evidence in support of the SID hypothesis for lawyers has been found by
14Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) for the case of Japan, and by Sobbrio et al. (2009) in the case
of Italy.
On the other hand, among health economists interested in physicians' incentives, a number
of studies have already attempted to empirically test the SID hypothesis. In general, several
studies have provided some evidence in support to the hypothesis. For instance, Fuchs (1978),
using cross-section data on US surgeons, found that an increase in 10% surgeon density led,
ceteris paribus, to a 3% increase in the frequency of surgery. Tussing (1983) used data from
Irish general practitioners and found that that the number of visits and the likelihood that a
visit was initiated by the physician were signicantly positively correlated with the number
of physicians per population. Adam (1983), Breyer (1984) and Breyer et al. (1986) analyzed
regional German data between 1977 and 1982 and, using multi-equation models to simul-
taneously explain physician density and per capita expenditure in medical services, found
statistically signicant elasticity of per capita expenditure to physician density (estimated
0.1-0.4 elasticity). Kraft et al. (1986) using data from a medical practice in the Canton of
Berne, Switzerland, found a statistically signicant, positive, correlation between expendi-
ture per medical case and physician density, and, after a Hausman test, concluded that the
latter was to be considered exogenous. Grytten et al. (1990) supported the SID hypothesis
for the Norwegian market for dental services, where, in a context of xed, uniform fees, both
the demand and the expenditure for dental services increased as the population/dentist ratio
decreased. Grytten et al. (1995), using Norwegian data, found some evidence of SID for
diagnostic laboratory tests requested by doctors. Gruber and Owings (1996), analyzed data
from the US National Hospital Discharge Survey in the 1970-1982 period (on 200.000 dis-
charges from 400 hospitals) and found evidence in favor of the SID hypothesis in the number
of Caesarian deliveries, more lucrative, and requiring a lower workload, to US obstetricians
than natural child birth deliveries. Van De Voorde et al. (2001), by estimating the eect of an
increase in co-payment rates on patients' out-of-pocket price elasticity, indirectly found some
evidence of inducement by general practitioners in Belgium, characterized by an excessive
supply of doctors and by a physician remuneration scheme based on fees for services.19
The ndings of the health economics literature are not unanimous, though. A number of
papers that tested the SID hypothesis, did not nd strong evidence in support of it. Rossiter
and Wilensky (1984), for instance, found little support for the SID hypothesis from the data
on expenditure for health services by a representative sample of US population, contained in
the National Medical Data Expenditure Survey. Grytten et al. (1995) used survey data on
physician-patient contacts for a representative sample of the Norwegian population and did
not nd any sign of SID on the number of physician-initiated visits, although they found some
evidence of it in the number of diagnostic laboratory tests required by physicians. Madden
et al. (2005) studied the eect of a change in the reimbursement system for Irish general
practitioners on the utilization of their services and found ambiguous evidence on SID.
The current debate in the health economics literature is mostly related to the choice of
the empirical strategy. Indeed, an accurate econometric analysis testing the SID hypothesis
should convincingly deal with the potential endogeneity and causality issues, and, ultimately,
on the selection of good instruments to be used in the instrumental variable estimation. We
will discuss our empirical methodology in the next Section.
19The validity of the empirical results by Van De Voorde et al. (2001) has been questioned by Cockx
and Brasseur (2003), who argued that the authors' estimated price elasticity ignored the substitution eects
induced by the change in relative prices of physician services.
154 Data Description and Panel analysis
Our balanced panel dataset comprises annual observations for the 103 provinces over the
period from 2000 to 2007.20 Data regarding civil proceedings and lawyers are collected at
the level of courts of justice and then aggregated at the level of the 103 Italian provinces.21
Civil litigation data come from the civil justice statistics recorded by the courts of justice.
These statistics are published yearly by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT) and allow
a disaggregation by province and type of litigation. In particular, we distinguish among
dierent forms of litigation: rst-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front of civil courts of
justice (courts of justice); rst-instance ordinary civil proceedings in front of honorary judges
of peace (judges of peace); total litigation rate, given by the sum of the previous two (total
litigation rate); and litigation for compensation (compensation).
The main explanatory variable is the number of lawyers over population at provincial level
(lawyers). As discussed above, we use the total number of lawyers enrolled in the pension
scheme, divided by local professional register, as obtained by Cassa Forense, the agency
managing the lawyers' pension scheme. In order to control for the lawyers-judges ratio and
for a proxy of productivity in each court, we add as explanatory variable the numbers of
judges over population at provincial level in each year (judges).
Our dataset also includes a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables that are
likely to be correlated with litigation rates. Demographic variables include the population
density in the province (density), and the concentration index (concentration), calculated
as the ratio between the population residing in the provincial administrative city over the
population in the rest of the provincial area. We include these variables as in more densely
populated areas the number of social interactions and, thus, the potential con
icts and dispute
are greater. Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real GDP per
capita, (GDP per capita), and the employment rate, (employment), which measure the size
and development of provincial economy, both of which have been proved to be potentially
correlated to the litigation rate (Posner, 1997; Hanssen, 1999; Clemenz and Gugler, 2000;
Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2006).
It may be argued that also the level of education of the population may aect the level of
civil litigation, although the direction of such an eect seems more ambiguous. In fact, on the
one hand, better educated population may also be more aware of their rights and, possibly,
more inclined to pursue their rights by accessing the courts. On the other hand, better
educated population may also be more aware of alternative ways of dispute resolution, or
more informed about the high costs and long time horizons necessary to conclude a dispute
in courts, and therefore, more discouraged to access courts of justice. In order to check
the eect and, if any, the direction of education on litigation, we include the percentage of
population with high school diploma as a proxy for education (high school).
Finally, the level of civil litigation may be aected by the level of social capital in the
province. For instance a higher level of social capital may reduce civil litigation since indi-
viduals are more respectful of contracts and laws and also because may favour an informal
resolution of civil disputes. Following Buonanno et al. (2009) we include, as a measure of
social capital, the density of associations (associations), namely the number of recreational,
20The choice of the period considered for our empirical estimation is motivated by the fact that, from 2008
on, the minimum fees set by the national council of lawyers are no longer considered as compulsory, in light
of the above discussed decree 223/2006. Moreover, 2008 data are not available.
21Italian provinces correspond to the NUTS3 areas and are comparable in size to US counties.
16cultural, artistic and sportive no-prot associations, every 100,000 inhabitants at provincial
level in each year.
Our list of control variables is likely to be incomplete, since it is impossible to control for
all factors aecting civil litigation. Thus, to control for unobserved factors, we exploit the
panel structure of our dataset and we include both province- and year-xed eects.
Detailed denitions and sources are presented for all of the variables in the Appendix.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, while Table 2 reports the correlation ma-
trix among all dependent and explanatory variables. As already mentioned, the correlation
between lawyers and civil litigation is positive for all types of civil litigation considered.
Our main estimating equation is
litigationit = lawyersit + 
0Xit + i + t + "it (1)
where litigationit is the log of the civil litigation rates recorded by the civil courts in province
i during year t; lawyerit is the number of lawyers over population; Xit is a set of control
variables; i and t are province- and year-xed eects; nally, "it is an error term.
The set of observables Xit comprises demographic and socioeconomic determinants of
civil litigation discussed and presented above.
OLS estimates on equation (1) are presented in table 3 and suggest that the dierent
measures of litigiosity are signicantly correlated with the incidence of lawyers in the popu-
lation.This relationship is overall robust across the dierent denitions of litigation rates and
even across alternative specications of determinants and controls of civil litigation. Accord-
ing to these ndings, a 10% increase in the number of lawyers over population is associated
with a 3% increase of total litigation rate, a 1.6% increase of litigation rate in civil courts of
justice, a 4% increase of litigation rate in front of honorary judges of peace and 5% increase
in litigation related to compensation.
Turning to the control variables, it emerges that GDP, employment rate and the number
of judges in the court do not exert a signicant eect on local litigation rates. Our mea-
sure for education is negatively correlated to litigation rates, even if not always signicant.
Population density is negatively and signicantly correlated with our dependent variables,
while concentration index exerts a positive and signicant eect on litigation rates. Finally
the level of social capital does not present consistent patterns and is sensitive to the type of
litigation rate considered.
However, there could be several reasons why the number of lawyers over population is
systematically correlated with litigiosity, some of which may not be adequately captured by
control variables. Therefore, identifying causality requires a source of exogenous variation in
the number of lawyers, an issue that we tackle in the next section.
5 Causality
Even after controlling for other determinants of litigation and for time and province xed
eects, the number of lawyers across provinces could be correlated with the error term for
several reasons. As discussed in Section 3, the SID hypothesis implies that an increase in
the number of lawyers and, therefore, of the degree of competition among legal professionals,
could lead lawyers to exploit their informational advantage to induce clients to demand legal
services and to access courts even when that would not be necessary or eective. In Section 3,
however, we have already mentioned an alternative explanation that may potentially explain
17a statistical relation between the number of lawyers and the litigation rate. In fact, it is in
theory possible that the local higher rate of civil litigation in a court had attracted lawyers
to that area, in the attempt to serve a share of the high demand.
5.1 Methodology
In order to address the endogeneity issue we need some variable that is a good measure of the
number of lawyers in a court but is exogenous to changes in the local litigation rates. Here
we consider two instrumental variables. The rst is based on the \xed coecient" approach
and uses national levels of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across
provinces. The second instrument, based on the methodology proposed by Card (1993), uses
the average proximity of the province to the three closest law schools.
The idea (and name) for the xed coecient approach comes from Freeman (1980), where
the author empirically assessed the ability of the xed coecient \manpower requirements"
model to explain future changes in employment. Following Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz
(1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Card (2001), Gould et al. (2002) and Cortes (2008), our
rst instrument (predicted lawyers) builds on the interaction between two sources of variation,
which are exogenous to changes in local markets for lawyers: the initial distribution of lawyers
across provinces and the trend, at a national level, in the number of lawyers.
Formally, the instrument for the number of lawyers in province i and year t is dened as
a province-specic weighted average of national lawyers:
\ lawyerit =  !iT  lawyert (2)
where \ lawyerit is the predicted number of lawyers in province i and periodt, lawyert is the
national number of lawyer in year t and !it is the share of lawyers in province i over the total
national number of lawyers in some base year T. In details, for each province i, we compute








In other words, the provincial share of lawyers in province i and some base year T indicates
the percentage of lawyers residing in province i over the national number of lawyer in some
base year T.
One concern is that the initial distribution of lawyers across provinces may re
ect expected
changes in the local litigation rate. To lessen any fear that the initial provincial share of
lawyers is itself endogenous, we use the 1992 provincial distribution instead of the 2000 one.
Moreover, as robustness checks, we use as initial provincial shares of lawyers, the distribution
across provinces in subsequent years: 1993, 1994 and 1995.
The above instrument is exogenous with respect to local litigation rates if both its compo-
nents are exogenous. As already mentioned, the provincial shares of lawyers in the base year
T ( !iT) is exogenous because measured in a period T preceding the time span to which our
data on litigation refer. On the other hand, the national trend in the number of lawyers are
mainly driven by demand for lawyers at a national level, and is therefore suciently exoge-
nous to provincial changes in the local markets for lawyers. This predicted measure conveys
the number of lawyers in each province that would have been observed if the distribution of
lawyers across provinces had not changed since period T.
18We also consider a second instrument (proximity) capturing the presence of law schools
accessible from a province, as this could clearly be related to the individual choice of subject
at university. Following Card (1993), we use as an instrument for the number of lawyers the
provincial proximity to schools where to pursue a degree in law. In particular, the instrument
we use is the average proximity between the three closest universities oering a degree allowing
to obtain a qualication as a lawyer. The latter aspect is particularly relevant in Italy, since
not only the Faculties of Law but also the ones of Economics and Political Sciences may oer
degrees in law that allow student to go through the selection process to become a lawyer. As
a robustness check, we also consider the average proximity between the thee closest Faculties
of Law to a province.
The Italian university system has two peculiar features in favour of our instrument: i)
there is very low mobility of students across cities and universities;22 ii) since Italian univer-
sities, except rare exceptions, are public, and generally charge fees signicantly lower than in
other European countries, the most relevant expense for university students are living and
travel costs. For this reason, the proximity of a law school may in
uence the choice of the
university subject by Italian students.








wheredijt are the three distances with the closest law courses that allow to undertake the exam
to become lawyer. As discussed in Section 2, access to the legal profession in Italy requires
a ve-year rst degree in law, followed by a two-year apprenticeship in a lawyers oce and a
successful exam for professional qualication, held once a year in each district of justice. For
this reason, we use the lagged proximity. In particular, we consider the localization of law
courses and law schools eight year before any corresponding data for the number of lawyers
and litigation rates. It is important to stress that our instrument is time variant for two
reasons: a) during the period considered new law schools or faculties have been set up and
b) new faculties have started oering courses in law.
5.2 Results
Once equipped with these instruments for lawyers, we proceed to analyze the eects on civil
litigation rates. Table 4 shows the results of our IV estimation that include province- and
year-xed eect. The rst stage regression conrms that our instruments t well. Both
predicted lawyers and proximity are strongly signicant and with the expected sign. IV
diagnostic shows the relevance of the instruments. The F-statistic of the regression is equal to
379.86, which is well above the lower bounds indicated by the literature on weak instruments
(see Bound and Holzer (2000) and Stock and Yogo (2002)). Moreover, the validity of our
instruments is conrmed by the Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions which fails to
reject the null hypothesis that the instrument are valid in all cases.
Overall, 2SLS estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the OLS
results. In particular, according to our IV estimates a 10% increase in the number of lawyers
over population is associated with a 3% increase of total litigation rate, a 1.6% increase of
litigation rate in civil courts of justice, a 4.5% increase of litigation rate in front of honorary
judges of peace and 6% increase in litigation related to compensation.
22Makovec (2005) and Brunello and Cappellari (2008) document that three quarters of the university stu-
dents in Italy attend a university degree in the same city where their parents live.
19As already mentioned, in order to test the robustness of our 2SLS estimates, we have
performed our IV regressions using as initial number of lawyers the distribution of lawyers
across provinces in subsequent years (1993, 1994 and 1995) and, instead of using the average
proximity from the three closest faculties oer a law degree, we have considered the average
proximity from the three closest Faculties of Law. Results (available on request from the
authors) are very robust to dierent specications and the magnitude and the signicance of
our coecients have not been aected.
Overall, our results suggest that there is a causal eect of the number of lawyers on
the civil litigation rates. Therefore our estimates allow us to exclude the reverse causality
explanation and to support the SID hypothesis.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several alternative specications designed to test the robustness
of our estimates.
A rst possible objection may be related to the fact that our estimates may be picking
some spurious eects that are not attributable to the lawyers themselves, but to a systematic
change in the economic structure of professions in Italy. In particular, as already discussed
in the introduction, also professional accountants and business consultants have experienced
a signicant increase over the last 15 years. Thus, in order to support or reject such an
objection, we re-run our regressions by using the number of professional accountants and
business consultants, rather than lawyers. The obtained results from such a regression,
presented in table 5, show that the eect of the number of professional accountants and
business consultants on civil litigation is not statistically dierent from zero, thus providing
no ground for the above objection.
Another possible objection could be related to the specic type of variables for the litiga-
tion rates used in our estimates. In particular, our empirical analysis focuses on litigation as
re
ected in civil courts, and therefore completely disregard the number of proceedings pend-
ing in front of penal courts. Concerning this point, there is a crucial dierence between civil
and penal cases in Italy. In fact, while a civil case may be started by any citizen, assisted by a
lawyer, and is therefore a natural candidate to test the SID hypothesis, a penal le have to be
started by a public prosecutor, thus leaving no room for inducement by lawyers. Therefore,
if we consider some measures of litigation in penal courts, we expect to see no eects exerted
by the number of lawyers. In our robustness check, we consider, for instance, three type of
very common property crimes: thefts, car thefts, bag snatches and murders. Our estimates,
presented in table 6, show that the number of lawyers in the court indeed does not exert any
signicant eect on the number of penal les, thus giving further support to our results.
Finally, we add to our main specication the lagged length of rst-instance trials as a
control, in order to test whether the expected length of the trial may aect the individual
decision to access to civil court. Our estimates, presented in table 7, conrm all main results
discussed above and show that the length of rst-instance trials is negatively correlated to
litigation rates, although with a small eect.
207 Conclusion
We have explored whether access to courts in Italy may be driven by the relative number
of lawyers active in the provincial courts of justice, in a typical supplier-induced demand
frame. We have collected data from dierent ocial sources and built an original dataset
on the 169 Italian courts of justice, considered in the period 2000-2007. Using panel data
estimation techniques, we have investigated the relationship between the local litigation rate
and access to the Italian courts of justice, and the number of lawyers ocially active in the
courts. We have controlled, among others, for the number of magistrates in the court, major
economic and socio-demographic characteristics of population, levels of education and social
capital in the province. We have addressed the endogeneity issue by constructing two original
instrumental variables: the rst, based on the xed coecient approach, uses national levels
of lawyers and lagged values of the local distribution of lawyers across provinces; the second
uses the average proximity of the province to the three closest law schools.
Our main result is that the number of lawyers operating in a court does exert a positive and
statistically signicant eect on the litigation rate. A 10% increase in the number of lawyers
over population is associated with a 1.6% to 6% in litigation rates. This eect is robust across
several specications and checks, both on the control variables and the instruments. Our
results thus support the SID hypothesis for the Italian lawyers. In particular, our evidence
supports the idea that, following an increase in their relative number, lawyers may exploit
their informational advantage to induce clients to access to courts even when litigation is
unnecessary or ineective. Our results thus suggest that a share of the massive in
ow of
new cases started in front of Italian civil courts of justice might be induced by lawyers under
an increased competitive pressure. It would be interesting to check whether the number
of lawyers operating in a court of justice could have also aected the length of the civil
proceedings. This is indeed the aim of our current research.
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24Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs. mean std. dev. min max
Total litigation 824 2.418 .450 1.464 4.200
Civil courts 824 1.816 .306 .955 2.734
Judges of peace 824 1.510 .705 -.149 4.078
Compensation 824 .597 .889 -1.215 3.664
Lawyers 824 1.656 .697 .126 6.995
Judges 824 .075 .0264 .024 .178
Accountants 824 .616 .229 .005 1.874
Density 824 246.027 331.301 22.954 2,640.92
Concentration 824 47.376 74.562 9.593 680.92
GDP 824 18,121.36 4,559.8 9,829.364 30,370.54
Employment 824 44.751 6.774 28.184 58.662
High school 824 .338 .039 .257 .485
Associations 824 33.727 16.340 7.75 104.73
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables across the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers .3099 .1664 .4539 .6086
(.0603) (.0593) (.0858) (.1061)
Judges -.2883 -.2253 -.1075 .7660
(.8780) (.6473) (1.1779) (.7833)
High school -1.9449 -2.6451 -1.8499 -.6108
(.7262) (.7085) (.9987) (.9066)
Associations .0051 .0034 .0033 -.0011
(.0017) (.0016) (.0023) (.0024)
GDP per capita .00002 7.00e-06 .00004 .00002
(1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05)
Employment .0079 .0060 .0065 .0059
(.0041) (.0039) (.0053) (.0051)
Density -.0029 -.0011 -.0050 -.0050
(.0007) (.0007) (.0010) (.0011)
Concentration .0129 .0067 .0209 .0225
(.0034) (.0032) (.0043) (.0056)
Hansen-J test 0.037 1.144 0.066 0.660
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The top panel of this table presents rst-stage estimates of IV regressions. The bottom panel reports
the results of 2SLS (second-stage) estimates on on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian provinces
during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded by the civil
courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. All control variables in Table 3 are always included,
both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for lawyers and civil litigation are Cassaforense
(Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. The
F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coecient on the excluded instruments are jointly equal to
zero in the rst stage. The Hansen J-test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square
under the null of instrument validity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and ***
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance
level, respectively.
28Table 5: Robustness check: Professional accountants
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accountants .1807 -.0512 .3843 .2770
(.2130) (.2553) (.2730) (.3761)
Judges -.2142 -.0860 -.1013 .8997
(.9958) (.7016) (1.2702) (.8982)
High School -2.2325 -2.7624 -2.3822 -1.3471
(1.0226) (.8898) (1.4345) (1.3787)
Associations .0041 .0026 .0021 -.0031
(.0020) (.0018) (.0028) (.0036)
GDP per capita .00002 9.00e-06 .00004 .00002
(.00002) (1.00e-05) (.00002) (.00002)
Employment .0091 .0065 .0084 .0086
(.0053) (.0044) (.0075) (.0079)
Density -.0034 -.0014 -.0057 -.0058
(.0018) (.0014) (.0026) (.0022)
Concentration .0123 .0066 .0194 .0203
(.0069) (.0049) (.0104) (.0141)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian
provinces during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded
by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The variable accountants is the number of
professional accountants over province population. The sources of data for accountants and civil litigation
are CNPADC (Professional Accountants Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables
are dened in the Appendix. Province and year xed-eects are included in all specications. Robust
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the
coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
29Table 6: Robustness check: Crime rates
Theft Car theft Bag snatch Murder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers .0654 .1092 .0619 -.0701
(.0410) (.0936) (.1156) (.1561)
Judges .1488 1.8552 .3145 .3577
(.4863) (.8819) (1.0840) (2.1031)
High School 1.5625 .1736 -.2640 4.1036
(.9415) (2.1689) (2.0220) (2.4933)
Associations .0002 .0007 -.0015 -.0018
(.0019) (.0038) (.0042) (.0067)
GDP per capita 8.81e-08 .00003 -6.00e-06 -1.00e-05
(1.00e-05) (.00002) (.00002) (.00004)
Employment .0030 .0055 .0045 .0072
(.0035) (.0110) (.0106) (.0162)
Density .0015 .0023 -.0073 .0023
(.0008) (.0014) (.0032) (.0020)
Concentration .0061 .0105 .0204 .0067
(.0034) (.0057) (.0055) (.0092)
Obs. 824 824 824 824
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations
for all 103 Italian provinces during the period 2000-2007. The dependent variable is the
log of crimes reported by the police over the total population, for each category of criminal
oense. The variable lawyers is the number of lawyers over province population. The sources
of data for lawyers and crime rates are Cassaforense (Lawyer Pension Agency) and ISTAT,
respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. Province and year xed-eects
are included in all specications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%,
5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
30Table 7: Robustness check: First-instance proceedings lenght
Total litigation rate Civil courts Judges of peace Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lawyers .2659 .2131 .3201 .4610
(.0847) (.0776) (.1094) (.1382)
Judges .2893 .1015 .6242 2.0735
(.9360) (.6202) (1.2203) (.9764)
Length 1 -.0001 -.0001 -.0001 -.00008
(.00004) (.00005) (.00007) (.00009)
High school -1.1699 -2.0785 -1.1614 -.9974
(.9825) (.8233) (1.4890) (1.3574)
Associations .0054 .0030 .0046 -.0006
(.0020) (.0016) (.0029) (.0031)
GDP per capita .00004 .00002 .00005 .00003
(.00002) (.00002) (.00002) (.00003)
Employment .0064 .0045 .0055 .0060
(.0051) (.0043) (.0076) (.0074)
Density -.0027 -.0014 -.0044 -.0051
(.0013) (.0011) (.0020) (.0018)
Concentration .0093 .0053 .0163 .0230
(.0043) (.0028) (.0079) (.0098)
Obs. 721 721 721 721
Provinces 103 103 103 103
Prov. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 103 Italian
provinces during the period 2001-2007. The dependent variable is the log of civil litigation rate recorded
by the civil courts of justice, for each category of civil litigation. The variable lawyers is the number of
lawyers over province population. The sources of data for lawyers and crime rates are Cassaforense (Lawyer
Pension Agency) and ISTAT, respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. Province and
year xed-eects are included in all specications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *,
** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
signicance level, respectively.
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